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
THE  
PRINCETON REVIEW

ON THE

STATE OF THE COUNTRY AND OF THE CHURCH.

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*October 1865.*



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ART. VI.—*The Princeton Review on the State of the Country  
and of the Church.*

THE last four years have been a period of unexampled excitement in the public mind. The conflict in which the country has been engaged has called forth the discussion of the most important questions concerning the nature of our government, the duties of the citizen, and the prerogatives of the church. In these discussions men of all classes have been forced to take part. The principles involved touched the conscience, and were therefore elevated above the sphere of mere politics. Hence not only secular journals and conventions, but religious papers and ecclesiastical bodies have freely and earnestly expressed their conviction on all the topics in controversy. Even the special advocates of the spirituality of the church, who professed to have washed their hands of all secular concerns, have been the most pronounced in their opinions, and the most vehement and pertinacious in advocating them. It was neither to be expected nor desired that a quarterly journal, like the *Princeton Review*, whose province it is to discuss all questions of general interest, although specially devoted to theological and ecclesiastical subjects, should remain silent in the midst of this universal agitation. It has not shrunk from the responsibility of taking its part in these grave discussions. Its record is a matter of history. There it stands open to the inspection of all who take any interest in its character and course. The *Review* has as freely as any other journal, and with the same right, neither more nor less, said what it felt bound to say, on Secession, on the Rebellion, on the duty of



loyalty, and the support of the Government; on Slavery and Emancipation; on the power and authority of church courts, within the limits of the Constitution; and on the principles which should govern our action in the great work of reconstruction, both in the church and state.

We have looked over the several articles in this journal published during the war, and we find in them nothing which we wish to retract. We are humbly thankful that our voice, however feeble, has throughout been on the side of the Union and of the Government, and against the whole course of those who endeavoured to dis sever the one and to overthrow the other. There is no journal in the land can present a fairer record of patriotism and loyalty. It is true, as the *Presbyterian Banner* of Pittsburg, in an excellent editorial printed in December, 1862, states (at least by implication), that among the supporters of the Union and the Government, there are two parties, a radical and a national party. On this subject it wisely taught, "That the people must be united. A platform, broad enough for all loyal people to stand upon, must be adopted. The Radicals cannot carry their principles through. It is utter folly in them to think so. They have not the numbers. The people will not go with them. And the Republicans cannot, as a party, so wage the battle as to triumph. They have the reins of government, but only half the people, a power far too weak. Neither could the Democrats, on party principles, succeed. . . . There must be union; and to have union we must adopt broad, noble, national principles." This is the ground on which we have always stood. Party politics, as such, have had no place in this *Review*. Radical principles and measures are alien to its character and spirit. It has advocated the national cause on national principles, as a great moral and religious duty. This we proceed to show, in deference to the judgment of others rather than of our own, as an answer to the strictures of which this *Review* has, especially of late, been made the subject.

As early as the fall of 1860, before the secession of states had actually begun, but when the attempt to dismember the Union was evidently imminent, an article was prepared on the State of the Country and published in the number for January,

1861. That article was designed to show: 1. That we are one nation, and not merely a confederacy of independent nations, and that the national union formed by the Constitution was founded on the immovable basis of community of origin, language and religion; upon identity of national interests; upon the geographical structure of the country; upon the common sufferings and labours of our revolutionary fathers, and the solemn oaths of all parties to our national compact. 2. That the South had no grounds of complaint against the action of the national government, and no shadow of a justification for attempting its overthrow. 3. That the right of secession does not exist; that it had been denied by the authors of the Constitution; repudiated by all parties, until a very recent period, that it was utterly destructive of our national existence, and if insisted upon, would issue in reducing us to a state of political chaos and anarchy. No article ever printed in this journal, from the pen of its editor, ever excited greater attention. This is to be attributed not to any merit in the article itself, but to the spirit of the times. It was reprinted at length in several of the religious papers of the widest circulation in the country. It was published in pamphlet form and distributed by thousands, by the friends of the Union and of the North; and it was sent abroad as representing the views of the supporters of the government. It was bitterly condemned and denounced by three classes of men. First, and principally at the South. The writer was there stigmatized as "An Abolitionist" and "Black Republican." A minister in South Carolina declared it to be his opinion that the article in question would "have the effect of dividing the Presbyterian Church"—and that there were not ten men in that state who would ever meet in General Assembly with the North, if Dr. Hodge is the true exponent of Northern sentiment." Dr. C. C. Jones said the article was an "assault upon the South, and a defence of anti-slavery and abolitionism in their baleful effects upon the country." In the second place, it was severely criticised by men at the North, who agreed with the South in principle and sympathized with it in feeling. Indeed many who now have advanced so far as to look upon this journal as behind the times, lukewarm in its patriotism and faltering in its loyalty, condemned the article



as too pronounced in the advocacy of Northern principles. Thirdly, as might be expected, we incurred anew the condemnation of men belonging to the radical party, of which Garrison and Wendell Phillips are the principal representatives. On the other hand, as already stated, the article was approved and widely disseminated by those most devoted to the support of the government and to the preservation of the Union. These facts afford, at least, *prima facie* evidence that the ground then assumed, and which has ever since been maintained, was that on which the great mass of loyal and patriotic men then stood, and on which they are still standing.

So far as secession is concerned, the sentiments expressed in our number for January, 1861, have been frequently reiterated since that period. In an extended article on "The Church and the Country," (April, 1861,) it was argued, "The right of secession is founded on the assumption that we are not a nation, and have no title to its prerogatives, and no right to exercise its functions. This is national death. It is not the loss of a member, but the extinction of the life of the body." "If a nation," it was said, "is an independent political community, having a common constitution, a common executive, legislature, and judiciary, whose laws are supreme in all parts of its territory, then are these United States a nation. If we are citizens not only of our several states, but also of the United States, then the United States constitute a commonwealth or political unit. If treason is a breach of allegiance, then as the Constitution defines such a crime as treason against the United States, the Constitution assumes that allegiance is due to the Union. If the Constitution and laws of the United States are the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any particular state to the contrary notwithstanding, then any law or ordinance of a state in conflict with the Constitution of the Union, is null and void. Then too, in the language of Henry Clay, is allegiance to the Union a higher and more sacred duty than allegiance to any individual state. This is no abstraction. It is not simply an idea. It does not merely hurt the understanding and shock the common sense of men, to deny our national character. It affects our vital interests. If secession concerned only the rights and well-being of the

seceding states, it would be a different matter. It affects equally the rights and welfare of all. The doctrine of secession throws the whole country into chaos. If one state secede, another may. . . . It is very evident that the people of this country will never give up their life in this way. They will never sanction a doctrine which not only destroys their existence as a nation, but which subjects them to intolerable wrongs."

II. Such being the doctrine of this *Review* on the right of secession, it of course has ever held and taught that the Rebellion of the Southern States was unjustifiable and a great crime. If throwing off their allegiance to the Union and organizing a separate confederacy, was not the exercise of a right recognized in the Constitution itself, it could be justified only on the ground of its being a revolution. But, while it is universally admitted that there are cases in which revolutions are justifiable and praiseworthy, it is as universally acknowledged that all rebellions, without adequate cause, are among the greatest of crimes. Treason, by the laws of all nations, our own among the number, is justly regarded and treated as a capital offence. If then the South owed allegiance, as this journal has ever taught, to the Constitution and the Union, and if, as it has taught with equal frequency and plainness, the Southern States had no just or even plausible ground for their renunciation of the Union, then it follows, that their attempted revolution was a great crime against God and man. The guilt of the rebellion was greatly enhanced if, as the Hon. Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia said, it sprang from the disappointed ambition of its leaders; or if, as was openly avowed by many of those leaders, it arose from the desire to extend and perpetuate slavery, and to found an empire of which slavery was to be the corner-stone, its guilt was only the more unmitigated. Accordingly this journal has laboured to impress upon its readers that the Southern Rebellion was unprovoked, unjustifiable, criminal, and designed for a purpose revolting to the moral sense of the Christian world. In the article last referred to, the grounds presented by the leading men of the South, on which they rested the justification of the rebellion, are examined in detail, and the attempt is made to show that they are utterly untenable. And



in another article entitled "England and America," (January, 1862,) we laboured at length to convince the few readers we have in Great Britain, that it was inconsistent with all their avowed principles and a grievous wrong to this country, that England should sympathize with the rebellion and lend it moral and material support. In April, 1861, it was said, that the ground most generally and confidently assumed in justification of the rebellion, is that presented by Dr. Thornwell, viz. "That slavery goes of right, and as a matter of course, into every part of the country from which it is not excluded by positive statute;" that neither the territorial legislatures, nor the Congress of the United States, have any authority to enact such exclusion; that the election of Mr. Lincoln committed the country to the opposite doctrine, and was therefore a virtual repeal of the Constitution. "The old government," he said, "is as completely abolished as if the people of the United States had met in convention and repealed the Constitution." The validity of this argument was denied in all its parts and principles, and the attempt was made to show that slavery did not, and could not exist anywhere in this country, except in virtue of the state laws; that it had no legal status in the free territories; that the election of Mr. Lincoln gave no colorable pretext for the dissolution of the Union, and consequently that rebellion on account of his election was utterly without excuse.

To English Christians, in our number for January 1862, it was said, American "Christians have been forced to the conclusion that England has in this great struggle taken the side of lawlessness, of slavery, and of violence, from selfish and dishonourable motives. This is a conclusion to which we have come with much the same reluctance with which we should admit the dishonour of a grey-headed father. But how can we resist it? We know the character of this rebellion. We know that it is unprovoked; that it is made simply in the interests of slavery. We know that it has been brought about by the long-continued machinations of able, but unprincipled men; that it has been consummated by acts of the grossest fraud, treachery, and spoliation. We know that it is directed to the overthrow of a just, equal, and beneficent government; and that, in all human probability, its success must be followed by the greatest evils for generations to



come. It is for the state of mind which leads to the dominant judgment of the English people in favour of an unjustifiable, pro-slavery rebellion, that the Christian world must hold them accountable." Numerous extracts were given in that article from the scathing denunciations of Count Gasparin in his work entitled "The Uprising of a Great People," published in the spring of 1861, when, as was said in this journal, "this rebellion had scarcely raised its hydra head." "It filled," we added, "American Christians with wonder and delight that God had given to his children abroad such just and elevated views of this great crisis in the world's history." "It is one thing," said Count Gasparin, "to hold slaves; it is another to be founded expressly to preserve slavery upon earth. This is a new fact in the history of mankind. If a Southern Confederacy should ever take rank among nations, it will represent slavery and nothing else. I am wrong; it will also represent the African slave-trade and the filibustering system. In any case, the Southern Confederacy will be so far identified with slavery, with its progress, with the measures designed to propagate it here below, that a chain and whip seem to be the only devices to be embroidered on its flag." Much more of like effect was quoted in these pages. These quotations were followed by a long array of arguments to prove that the great design of the rebellion was to extend and perpetuate the system of African slavery; and this design was denounced as unchristian and wicked. It is not in the power of ignorance or malice to believe that the *Princeton Review* or its editor has ever had the slightest sympathy with the South in this great national conflict. We have indeed never said or believed, that all who were engaged in the rebellion were influenced by the desire to subserve the cause of slavery. Some were controlled by one motive, and some by another. Some were simply borne along by the excitement around them. Some were actuated by state pride, or affection from their section of the Union. But that the rebellion had for its origin the desire to conserve and extend the system of slavery we have never had the least doubt. It had been for years predicted that slavery would be the rock on which the Union would split. It is an institution so repugnant to the feelings and conscience of the great mass of mankind,

that it instinctively dreads aggression. It had been abolished in the Northern states, and in the dominions of France and England, and almost in every place where slaveholders are in the minority in numbers or influence. Mr. Calhoun, as long ago as 1812, (according to the testimony of Commodore Stewart) said, that as soon as the South ceased to control the Union, it must leave it. Slavery had been the great bone of contention between the North and South from the beginning. It came near dividing the country in 1820, when the Missouri Compromise was adopted. All the efforts to effect a compromise which should prevent secession and civil war were directed to the single point of slavery. When secession occurred, it was justified, as in the seceding ordinance of South Carolina, on the ground that the peculiar institution of the South was in danger, and that a president had been elected who was hostile to slavery. When the conflict began, the Richmond editors called upon slaveholders to bear the burden of the war because it was made for them. And a Charleston paper, towards the very end of the struggle, declared that it desired independence for the sake of slavery, and that without slavery, independence was of little account. It is needless to argue such a point. It has been so clearly manifested, and so openly avowed, that the security and extension of slavery was the great object of the rebellion that all honest doubt on the subject seems to be impossible. If this be so, and if no aggression on the rights of the South in relation to their peculiar institution had been made or attempted by the national government, as this *Review* has ever maintained and laboured to prove, then it follows that the rebellion, according to the doctrine of this journal, was unprovoked and wicked.

III. If this be so, it follows that the war undertaken for its suppression and for the preservation of our national existence, was a righteous war. And this also we have always maintained in public and in private, by pen and speech. In view of the dreadful horrors inseparable from a protracted civil war, on the stupendous scale of a conflict between the Northern and Southern states of this Union, we, in common with a multitude of the most loyal and patriotic men in the country, thought, before the conflict began, that it would be wise to



consent to a peaceful separation, provided, 1st. That the right of secession be repudiated, and the separation should be effected by the common consent of the parties to our national compact. And provided, 2dly. That the terms of the separation should be so arranged as to secure the essential rights and interests of the North as well as of the South. But when the South took the matter into its own hands, and claimed the right of each state to withdraw from the Union at pleasure, and attempted to carry out this pretended right by seizing on the national forts and arsenals, firing on the national flag, and by the bombardment of Sumter, then the case was essentially altered. Then the conflict became one of principle, a principle essential to our national life, and the war for the suppression of the rebellion became in our view, as in the view of the great body of the North, not only righteous, but indispensable. The government had been recreant to its most sacred duties, and the people to their plainest obligations as American citizens, had they not put forth all their strength for the preservation of the Constitution and the Union. Maine was at one time a part of Massachusetts. When the people of that section desired an independent state organization, it was wise in Massachusetts to consent to the separation. But if instead of adopting this peaceable method of attaining their end, they had claimed the right to go off when they pleased, and had begun to seize on all public property, and kill every Massachusetts man who interfered with their proceedings, it would have become a great national duty to put them down as rebels. It is in perfect consistency therefore with our original desire to escape a civil war by consenting to a peaceable separation, that we were, from the beginning to the end, the zealous advocates of the justice of the war forced upon us by the South. Accordingly in every article bearing in any way on the subject, published in this *Review* since the war began, we have upheld the righteousness of the national cause, and urged on our readers the moral as well as the civil duty of sustaining the government, and submitting to all privations and burdens necessary to the successful conduct of the conflict. We avowed our hearty concurrence in the sentiments sustained in the Spring resolution, adopted by the Assembly in 1861, and stated on the floor of that

Assembly that we would cheerfully vote for them if presented in the Synod of New Jersey. We concurred with equal sincerity in the paper presented by Dr. R. J. Breckinridge in the Assembly of 1862; and in every declaration of patriotic devotion and loyalty uttered by that body. Where we have differed from our brethren, it has not been on these, but on other, and subordinate points, to which we shall have occasion to refer in the sequel. In the most gloomy period of the war (January 1863) we concluded a long article as follows: "In view of the present state of the country, it is certainly imperative on all good men to unite in support of the government; to render those in authority all the aid they need to carry on this struggle to a successful issue; cheerfully to submit to all burdens and sacrifices which the war imposes; and to render prompt and hearty obedience to all the lawful commands of the powers that be. This duty does not depend on the opinion which men may form of the national administration. Whether the weakest or the wisest government the country ever had, the duty of submission and devotion is still the same. The threats of revolutionary or factious opposition, which have at times been made, are in the highest degree criminal. Our only safety is in fidelity to the Constitution and to our constitutional rulers. Another duty which presses on all loyal citizens, is not to despond. The work which we have undertaken is a great work. To sustain the Constitution and Union against an organized rebellion of eleven states, and the divided allegiance of several others, is a herculean task. It must be expected to demand great effort and great sacrifices. There is no sufficient cause for discouragement, if we can only be united and persevering. Confident in the justice of the national cause, assured that God is on our side, we are bound not to despond. We should remember that we are acting for generations to come; that the fate of the country, and in a large measure of Christendom, hangs on the issue of this conflict. The question, as it seems to us, to be determined is: Whether North America is to be the abode of liberty and constitutional order, or converted through the greater part of its extent, into a vast empire in which the blacks shall be slaves, and all, except slaveholders, miserable serfs." As the time has come when



the friends of Mr. Lincoln and of President Johnson have to defend them from the charge of lukewarm loyalty and half-hearted devotion to the country, we cannot be surprised that the same necessity is laid on some who move in a much humbler sphere. It is a comfort however that the charges in both cases come from the same class of men.

IV. With regard to slavery, both as in its moral and political aspect, we stand now just where we always have stood. The doctrine advocated in this journal in 1836 is still our doctrine. We are not aware that there is a sentence in the article printed in that year, which we would desire to retract or modify. Slavery in that article is defined to be a state of involuntary bondage; the state in which one man is bound to labour for another, without his own consent. The correctness of this definition has been denied, and we have been denounced as having thrown a veil over the moral turpitude of the system by propounding it. On this subject Dr. McMaster said "The editor of the *Princeton Review* clings to this obviously false definition of slavery, with dogged pertinacity as great as if he thought the salvation of the church and of the country depended on his maintaining it. This false definition of slavery is the source of much of the confusion of thought and ambiguity of language which have pervaded all his articles, through twenty-five years, on the subject, and of the wide-spread mischief which they have wrought. Let it be admitted that slavery is what all competent authority defines it to be, the system makes the legal status of men, women and children, to be that of property; that is, of real estate, or chattels personal, as the case may be; and slavery is condemned as a sin against God, and the most gross outrage upon man." On this, although an old and threadbare subject, we have two things to say. The definition of a slave as one who without contract or consent on his part is bound to labour for another, is not only a correct definition, but all but universally admitted and received as such. Its correctness is proved from an analysis of the subject. Slavery has existed in many ages, in many parts of the world, and under very diverse systems and laws. A man may be a slave for a term of years, for life, or his status may be hereditary. His master may be clothed with greater or less power over him, but

in all cases the generic idea, that which constitutes slavery under all its diversities, is involuntary bondage, not inflicted for the punishment of crime. This is the definition given by the old Roman lawyers; by modern jurists; by moral philosophers; by the Constitution of the United States, where a slave is defined to be "a person held to service;" by Southern statesmen and theologians. All this we have abundantly proved before. (See *Princeton Review*, April 1861, as well as April 1836.) The second remark, which we have to make, is that Dr. McMaster's definition, if it have any meaning, does not differ from our own. He says a slave is one who is the property of his master. What does that mean? It means that the master has a right to his labour. That is all it can mean. When a man owns a horse he has a right to his services as a horse. If the law allows him to own a man, he has a right to that man's services as a man, and to nothing more. Property in a horse does not entitle the owner to ill-use the animal; and property in a man does not entitle the owner to ill-use the man. The horse, under the law of God, is entitled to everything his nature as a horse demands; and the man (although a slave), under the same high law, is entitled to all that his nature as a man demands. What becomes then of all Dr. McMaster's declamation and unbrotherly abuse.

Concerning slavery as thus properly defined we have always taught—1st. That it is a matter of indifference. It may be right or wrong, just or unjust, beneficent or cruel, according to circumstances. And consequently that the fundamental principle of abolitionism, that all slaveholding is sinful, that slaveholders as such should be excluded from the Christian church, and that slavery should be everywhere and immediately abolished, is false and unscriptural.\* 2d. That the slave laws of

\* This it seems is not now denied even by many professed abolitionists. Dr. McMaster says that if our definition be admitted, "it would make all condemnation of slavery simply absurd. What rational man ever thought it immoral to hold in involuntary servitude any one who is, by his own mental state, unfit for freedom, till he is twenty-one, or forty-one, or eighty-one years of age?" A Kentucky paper says that Dr. Monfort sent to it an advertisement, in which he said, "The '*Presbyter*' has always opposed the abolition doctrine that slaveholding is necessarily sinful, and it defends all the deliverances of the General Assembly on slavery;" and of course that of 1845, among the rest.



the South which forbid slaves to be taught to read and write; which authorize the separation of parents and minor children, of husbands and wives; which ignore and deny legal marriage to those held as slaves; which justify, or give impunity to cruelty, were an abomination. They ought never to have been enacted; they should have been everywhere and immediately repealed. As by slavery, the popular mind and, in many cases, public bodies secular and ecclesiastical, understood the concrete slave system as it is prevalent in the Southern states, those bodies were right in declaring it to be a system of gross injustice, a sin in the sight of God and man. 3d. We have always maintained that slavery was a municipal institution, founded upon the *lex loci*, and therefore was not entitled to go into any state or territory where it had not been by law established; and therefore that the claim of the South to the right to carry their slaves and have their property in them protected in all the territories of the United States, was unfounded and unconstitutional. 4th. As long ago as 1836, and in the years subsequent, we expressed the opinion that the sudden and general emancipation of all the slaves in this country would be disastrous both for the blacks and the whites; that the scriptural method of dealing with this great subject, *i. e.*, the method, as it seemed to us, which the principles of the gospel dictated, was the immediate repeal of all the unjust slave laws; the legal recognition of their conjugal and parental rights, their right to acquire and hold property, and their claim to a just compensation for their labour; provision for their moral, religious, and intellectual culture, and liberty at any time to acquire their freedom by the payment of a sum to be determined in each case by a public officer appointed for that purpose. In that way we believe the whole system would be gradually, peacefully, and speedily abolished, and the slaves elevated and prepared for liberty. The South not only refused to enter on any course tending to the abolition of slavery, but became more and more enamoured with the system; more than ever devoted to perpetuate and extend it, and at last, to accomplish this end, rose in rebellion for the overthrow of the Constitution and the violent disruption of the Union. This altered the whole case. Slavery then became not a matter for the South only, but

assumed the posture of an avowed enemy of the nation. When the war was thus inaugurated in the interests of slavery, we fully recognized the principle that the President, as Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, as he had the right to seize private property necessary for the military service, so he had the right to emancipate the slaves within the lines of the armies of the United States; so that as our armies advanced, slavery would necessarily disappear before them. And further than this, we fully recognize the right of the government to demand the abolition of slavery as a condition of the admission of any of the revolted states to their status in the Union. On this subject in our number for July, 1864, we said, "We fully believe that the leaders of the present rebellion, years ago, determined on the overthrow of the Constitution, and the erection of a Southern Confederacy, in order to perpetuate and extend the system of African slavery as it now exists; that for this purpose they not only systematically misrepresented the opinions and purposes of Northern men in order to prejudice and inflame the Southern mind; but that they made extensive military preparations, by fraudulently amassing public arms in southern arsenals, and by leaving the national forts in the slave states without adequate protection. We believe that without any just, or even plausible provocation, and against the advice and warning of the wisest and best of the slaveholders themselves, they threw off their allegiance to the United States Government, and to the Constitution which they had sworn to support, seized the public forts and arsenals, fired on the flag of their country, and inaugurated a civil war which has already cost hundreds of thousands of lives and many thousands of millions of dollars. During the three years which this war has continued, the President and Congress have repeatedly and authoritatively proclaimed that if those in revolt against the Constitution and the Union would lay down their arms, return to their allegiance, and submit to the laws of the land, the war should cease, and the states be restored with the right to determine their institutions each for itself within its own limits. These overtures were contemptuously rejected, and the war has been carried on, and, in many cases, with savage barbarity. The issue has thus been fairly presented. Either our national



life or slavery must be extinguished. This issue our General Assembly has met, by declaring unanimously that the time has come when slavery should be at once and for ever abolished in the States and Territories of this Union. In this declaration our understanding, heart, and conscience, fully concur."

Finally, so far as this subject of slavery is concerned, we stated in our last number (July 1865) that the principles on which President Lincoln acted, and in which we heartily concurred, were: "1. That all men are the children of Adam, made of one blood and possessing the same nature; and therefore are all entitled to be regarded and treated as men. No system of permanent slavery can be justified except on the assumption that the enslaved class are a different and inferior race of beings. If all men are by nature one, if all have the same essential elements of humanity, there can be no just reason why any one class should be for ever condemned to inferiority and bondage. It was the great scriptural truth of the unity of the human race as to origin and species, which lay at the foundation of all President Lincoln's opinions and policy in regard to slavery. 2. This being the case, neither the colour of the skin, nor unessential differences in the varieties of men, is any just ground for a permanent distinction between one class and another. He held that every man fit to be free (and not otherwise) was entitled to be free; that every man able to manage property had the right to hold property; and that every man capable of discharging the duties of a father is entitled to the custody of his children. From this it would follow, by parity of reasoning, that every man who has the intelligence and moral character necessary to the proper exercise of the elective franchise is entitled to enjoy it, if compatible with the public good. In other words, these rights and privileges cannot justly be made dependent on the colour of the skin or any other adventitious difference."

V. Another topic necessarily involved in the exciting controversies of the last few years was the power of the church and the proper sphere of its action.

According to our theory of civil government all power resides in the people. Legislative bodies and executive officers are delegates of the people and possess no prerogatives not

especially granted to them. Our written constitutions, therefore, national and state, are the measure of the power confided to the public servants of all classes. This theory has been transferred to the church. It is a popular idea that church courts derive their authority from the people, and that our Constitution and Form of Government are the instruments by which that power is conveyed, and the measure of its extent. According to this theory a session would have no right to receive members into the communion of the church or to exclude them from it, if the Constitution did not so appoint. In like manner a presbytery could not ordain a man to the ministry, or exercise any other prerogative, unless the power had been expressly granted. This is not Presbyterianism. Church courts are of Divine appointment. They derive their power from Christ through his written word. The Constitution is not a grant of powers, but an agreement between different presbyteries and other church courts, as to the manner in which its inherent authority as a court of Christ shall be exercised. Every presbytery has the inherent right to ordain any man to the ministry whom it believes to be called of God to that office. But our numerous presbyteries have agreed together not to ordain any man to the sacred office, who has not had a liberal education; who has not studied theology at least two years; and who is not able to read the Scriptures in the original languages in which they were written. They have entered into various other agreements by which they are limited in the exercise of the powers derived from Christ. The same remark evidently applies equally to our Synods and General Assemblies. The Constitution is not to them a grant of power, but a compact according to which they are bound to exercise the prerogatives which belong to them as the divinely appointed organs of the church. The first General Assembly of the Church of Scotland met before there was any formal written Constitution of the Scotch Church, but it met with all the powers that it ever at a later period possessed.

The limits assigned to the power of church courts are all determined directly or indirectly by the word of God. Deriving all their authority from that source, they can rightly claim nothing but what is therein granted. As they are church



courts, their authority is confined to the church. It does not extend to those who "are without." It follows also from the same premises that being church-courts they must be confined in their jurisdiction to church-matters. They have nothing to do with matters of commerce, agriculture, or the fine arts, nor with the affairs of the state. They can only expound and apply the word of God to matters of truth and duty, and to the reforming of abuses, or to the discipline of offences. They may make orders for the conduct of public worship and the administration of God's house, but they have nothing to do with secular affairs. With regard to the proper sphere of the church's action we have the plain and easily applicable rule derived from the nature of the church and the design of its institution. It is the company of God's professing people, together with their children. It was instituted to teach, maintain, and propagate the truth. Everything therefore which is without the sphere of the Divine teaching is foreign to the church. Everything to which that teaching applies is within her legitimate cognizance. Whatever may be proved to be false by the word of God, the church is bound to denounce as error. Whatever the Scriptures declare to be truth, the church is called upon to urge on the faith of all who can hear her voice. And in like manner she is authorized and bound to press upon the consciences of men whatever the law of God pronounces to be morally right, and to warn them against whatever the same authority declares to be morally wrong. The Bible does not prescribe any particular form of civil government; the church therefore has no right to denounce despotism, monarchy, aristocracy, or republicanism, as morally wrong. As the Scriptures give no rule for the direction of the commercial or other civil affairs of men, the church cannot dictate to the state what line of policy as to such matters it shall adopt. But as marriage and divorce are matters which are determined by the Divine law, the church is bound to bear her testimony against all laws of the state relating thereto, which are in conflict with the Divine law. As the Bible commands obedience to the powers that be, it is clearly within the province of the church to enjoin on all her members obedience, allegiance, and loyalty. This is as plainly her duty as it is to teach that children should be obedient to

their parents, or servants to their masters. But as the Scriptures do not give us any rules by which we can determine between conflicting claimants, who is entitled to authority; which descendant of a monarch is next in succession; or which candidate for office has been duly elected, it is not the province of the church to decide any of these questions. In like manner, as the Bible does not enable any man to decide whether these United States are a nation, or a voluntary confederacy of nations, the church has no voice in the decision of that question. Her members must determine it for themselves, and on their own responsibility. It was on this ground that the editor of this *Review*, with many others, protested against the action of the Assembly of 1861, in adopting the Spring resolutions. In those resolutions it was declared to be the duty of the Christians in the seceding states to support the national government. If the Northern (and as we believe the true) theory of our Constitution is correct, it was their duty. If the Calhoun (or Southern) theory is correct, it was not their duty. Which theory was right, we maintained then, as we do now, it was not the province of the Assembly to decide. It was purely a political question, for the decision of which the word of God gives no direction. We had no doubt that the citizen owes allegiance and cordial support to the civil government; and we as little doubted that it is the duty of the church to enforce the duty of such allegiance and support. But the question, whether the state or national government in our system be supreme, it is the business of the state, the people, and the civil courts to decide. In their several synods and presbyteries most of the signers of that protest heartily joined in passing still more stringent resolutions; because the people whom they addressed had no such political question to decide. The synods and presbyteries only required the people under their charge to do what the word of God commanded them to do, viz., to be loyal and devoted to the government whose authority no man disputed. And when, in 1862, the Assembly represented the loyal or non-seceding states, it was perfectly competent for that body to adopt the paper presented by the Rev. Dr. R. J. Breckinridge; and it was perfectly consistent in him to present that



paper, although he had severely denounced the action of the preceding Assembly.

All this seems to us so perfectly plain, that it is a matter of surprise that it ever should be called into question. The limits of the church authority are clearly marked out in the Bible, and they have, in this country at least, not been mistaken, except in times of excitement, when the minds of men are apt to be blinded or perverted. In opposition to the principles above stated, Dr. Thornwell in the Assembly of 1859, presented a new theory. A motion had been made to recommend the American Colonization Society to the support of our people. This Dr. Thornwell opposed as falling outside of the proper sphere of the church. He succeeded in getting the motion laid on the table by a vote of sixty-four to fifty-four. It was urged that the church was in such a sense a spiritual body, clothed only with spiritual powers for spiritual ends, that all intermeddling with anything not directly bearing on the spiritual and eternal interests of men was foreign to its office and derogatory to its dignity. All this is true, but it is very ambiguous. If by *spiritual*, be meant what relates to the spirit, in the sense of the moral and religious nature of man, then it is true that the church is restricted in her action to what is purely spiritual. But if the word be so restricted as to confine it to what pertains exclusively to the religious element of our nature, to what concerns the method of salvation, as distinguished from the law of God, then the above principle is most obviously false. The word was understood in a sense so limited as to deny to the church the right to protest against the slave trade, or unjust slave laws, as well as against rebellion and disloyalty. It is no disrespect to say that men adopt theories to suit their purposes. Having a certain cause of action at heart, it is easy for the feelings to beguile the understanding into the adoption of a principle to justify or require what they have determined to do, or desire to accomplish. A few years before the war, the doctrine that any state of the Union has a right to secede and become an independent commonwealth, was confined to a very small class of Southern men. But when the desire to dismember the Union took possession of the Southern mind, the new theory was adopted with unanimity and fervor.

A large class of our brethren were very anxious to keep all discussions about slavery out of the General Assembly; and since the war, still more desirous to prevent the church throwing her influence on the side of the Government and the Union, and hence this new doctrine as to the office of the church was originated and has since been so fiercely advocated. It would, we presume, be very difficult to find a single advocate of the theory, who is not a pro-slavery man and an ardent sympathizer with the South. There may be others, but we do not know them. The doctrine is so palpably unsound and untenable, that it was rejected by a unanimous vote in the Assembly of 1860. It contradicts the great principle, universally admitted hitherto, that the church, as the witness of God, is bound to bear her testimony against all sin and error, and in favour of all truth and righteousness, agreeably to the Scriptures; that is, guided by the word of God in her judgments and declarations. If the laws of the community under which we live, with regard to slavery, the slave-trade, to marriage and divorce, and the like, are contrary to the word of God, then the church is bound so to teach and so to preach. In like manner, if the Bible prescribes the relative duties of parents and children, of masters and servants, of citizens and magistrates, then the church is unfaithful to her trust if she does not inculcate and enforce those duties. As Southern men, after the formation of their Confederacy, found it impossible to recognize the right of secession from their body, but, as some of their own leading statesmen avowed, were forced to establish a concentrated military despotism, so the originators and advocates of the new theory respecting the office of the church were forced to abandon it. We find Dr. Thornwell preaching from the sacred desk elaborate sermons on slavery, and writing articles in religious journals on the state of the country. The pulpits of the South rang perpetually (as we have been credibly informed), with political harangues, *i. e.* harangues designed to "fire the Southern heart" in the great struggle. The church papers were filled week after week with articles vindicating Southern principles and censuring the national government. Synods pledged themselves to the support of the new confederacy, and in short the whole church South was possessed and animated by what its members re-



garded the spirit of patriotism and loyalty, to the almost entire exclusion, as it appeared to their Northern brethren, of the spirit of the gospel. We do not blame those brethren for violating a false principle, and disregarding their own erroneous theory, but we protest against their condemning in others what they justify in themselves. If they may preach and write to prove that slavery is "a Divine institution," we may endeavour to prove that it is "a low state of civilization," from which the slaves should be elevated and delivered as soon as possible. If they may, heart and soul, embrace the Southern cause and advocate Southern principles in the pulpit, in church-courts, and in the religious journals, we may do the same for the national cause and national principles. There is, however, no room for debate on this subject. This new theory of the church is as practically dead (except for the purpose of faction), as is the theory of secession, and both, as Siamese twins, may be allowed to pass into oblivion together.

So much as to the proper office of the church and the legitimate sphere of her action. The next question is, What is the authority due to the deliverances of our ecclesiastical judicatories, and specially of the General Assembly. As to this point we do not believe there is any real difference of opinion among true Presbyterians.

1. It is admitted that church courts are not infallible. "All synods or councils," says our Confession, "since the apostles' times, whether general or particular, may err, and many have erred; therefore they are not to be made the rule of faith or practice, but to be used as a help to both." If not a rule of faith or practice, acquiescence in their deliverances cannot be made a term either of Christian or ministerial communion. Acquiescence in their deliverances, it is to be observed, being a very different thing from submission to their judicial decisions. The whole country submitted to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dred Scott, but was far from acquiescing in the deliverance of the court in that case. This, however, is by the way.

2. If the deliverances of ecclesiastical bodies be not infallible, then there must be a judge of their correctness, and a standard by which that judgment is to be formed. The judge is every

man who chooses to exercise the privilege. If Paul recognizes the right of private judgment, even in reference to the preaching of an apostle, or of an angel from heaven, surely it will not be denied with regard to the acts of any body of fallible and sinful men. The standard of judgment is of course the holy Scriptures. Our Confession tells us the decrees and determinations of councils are to be received only when "consonant to the word of God." As an exposition of the word of God, admitted as authority among Presbyterians, we have our Confession of Faith and Form of Government, which constitute our ecclesiastical constitution. The censure, therefore, which has been heaped upon this *Review* for the expression of its dissent from certain acts of the Assembly, as an act of presumption unbecoming in the members and servants of the church, are, to say the least, undeserved. Those censures, however, are not to be understood as the denial of the right to dissent, or of the right to discuss the correctness of the acts in question. Such denial would be simply absurd. Those censures are merely the expressions of feeling. Those who utter them claim and exercise the right of approving or disapproving all the deliverances of church-courts. They have been specially forward in the exercise of that right. The Old-school not only openly censured the acts of those assemblies in which New-school men had the ascendancy, but many of them were ready to divide the church rather than submit to them. This is a matter too plain to need remark.

3. It follows from what has been said, that the deliverances of ecclesiastical courts, from the lowest to the highest, cease to have any binding force, First, when they transcend the sphere of the legitimate action of the church. We all agree that if the state should undertake to legislate on matters of faith, and make it a penal offence to be a Presbyterian, or a Methodist, its acts would be null and void, and might be, and should be disregarded. In like manner, if the church should attempt to legislate on matters beyond her sphere, to order all its members to be Democrats or Republicans; to vote for this or that candidate, or for this or that commercial or financial measure, her action in the premises would be of no account. Should our Assembly declare that Hayne's speech in favour of nullification



was heretical, and Webster's speech against it orthodox; or that Calhoun's theory of state rights was false, and that Andrew Jackson's doctrine, that the Union is indissoluble (except by common consent), is correct, would it amount to anything? Every man would be entitled to his opinion after such a declaration as much as before. Dr. Thornwell succeeded at the close of the Assembly in 1859 in getting sixty-four members (a casual majority), apparently to sanction his new theory of church power. Suppose that under a similar concurrence of circumstances he had got a like casual majority to declare in favour of the doctrines of Hayne and Calhoun, how then? Should we all be bound to be nullifiers and secessionists? This again is a matter about which there can be no doubt.

4th. Any action of the Assembly in contravention of the compact contained in our Constitution, is of no binding force. The Constitution allows the presbyteries to ordain a man to the ministry who has studied theology two years. If the Assembly should order them not to ordain a candidate unless he had studied three or four years, they might disregard such order without any breach of the deference or submission due to our highest judicatory. The Bible enjoins and our standards prescribe, that those whom Christ receives as his disciples, the church should receive to her fellowship. All those who, possessing competent knowledge, make a credible profession of repentance toward God and faith in our Lord Jesus, every one admits the church is bound to receive to her communion. She has no more right to alter the terms of admission into the church, than she has to alter the conditions of admission into heaven. The assumption would be as arrogant and intolerable in the one case as in the other. If the Assembly therefore should make it a condition of Christian communion, or church-fellowship, that a man should or should not sing Watts's hymns; or that he should take a pledge of total abstinence from wine and all other intoxicating liquors; or profess abolitionism, or advocate the divine right of slavery, all such orders, acts, or resolutions, would be cobwebs which any people who had the Spirit of the Lord (who is a spirit of liberty), in them, would brush away in a moment. In like manner the Bible prescribes the qualifications for the ministry and the evi-

dences of a Divine call to the same office. And our Constitution states the conditions on which men may be admitted to the exercise of that office in our church. The General Assembly cannot add to, or detract from those conditions. If a candidate for ordination, or an applicant for admission to one of our presbyteries complies with the terms prescribed; if he has the requisite knowledge and gifts, and sincerely adopts our standards of doctrine and order, the presbytery may ordain or receive him in opposition to any further prescriptions of the Assembly. The Assembly for prudential reasons may enjoin on the presbyteries to exercise due care in the reception of members, in order to have evidence satisfactory to themselves and to the other presbyteries, that the applicant really is what he professes to be. The rule requiring an examination of ministers from other presbyteries, and that prescribing six months probation of those coming to us from abroad, are not rules altering the conditions of membership, and therefore have almost universally been recognized as obligatory and wise. But if the Assembly should assume the prerogative of altering the terms of ministerial communion in our church, it would be an arrogation of a power which does not belong to it. If it were to order the presbyteries to receive no man who was a democrat, or a federalist, or a disciple of Webster or of Hayne; or an abolitionist, or a free-soiler, it would evidently be of no binding force. Neither can the Assembly make agreement with any of its own deliverances a term of ministerial fellowship. If one Assembly can do it, another may. If the Assembly of 1864 or 1865 could do it, the Assemblies of 1835 and 1836, with their New-school majorities, had the same right. And if the Assembly can make one of its deliverances a term of membership, she may make another, or all of them. If she may require subscription to the paper adopted in 1865, she may demand acquiescence in that of 1845. The abolitionist receives the one, and spurns the other. He is in favour of enforcing the one, and of trampling on the other. This will not do. The church will not consent to be thus driven from post to pillar; required to adopt first one creed and then another, with the varying majorities in our General Assemblies.



We are bound, as to this matter, by the word of God, and the Constitution of the church, and nothing else.

The limitations above mentioned of the power of our church courts are all self-evidently just, and are all universally admitted in theory; and, what is more, they are all universally acted upon by all parties, whenever the Assembly happens to be against them. It is only when that body is on their side that any party desires to enforce its action as a rule of faith and practice upon others. The legitimate authority of the Assembly is left, by our doctrine, undisturbed. That body has space and verge enough in which to act. Its judicial decisions are admitted to be final. They must be submitted to whether they are deemed wise or unwise. Their recommendations are always to be received with the respect and deference due to the highest court of our church. Their deliverances with regard to matters of faith and morals are to be accepted and followed whenever, as our Confession says, consonant to the word of God. And all its acts and orders are to be respected and obeyed, within the legitimate sphere of its action and the limits of the Constitution. More than this cannot be conceded by any intelligent and sincere Presbyterian, or by any true Protestant.

VI. There is one other subject on which we feel constrained to say a word in explanation and vindication of the course of this *Review*. It is the union of the churches. On this point we have uniformly taught:

1. That Christ commands his people to be one. That this command refers not only to unity of faith and love, but also to ministerial and Christian fellowship, and still further, to organic external union.

2. As to this last mentioned particular, it is necessarily in a measure limited by geographical position and political relations. The same kind of external union cannot well exist between the Christians in Europe and Asia, as between those who dwell in the same province or kingdom. And further, external union is either impracticable or undesirable where conscientious differences exist, which would necessarily prevent harmonious action.

3. It is the duty of all those who agree in matters of faith and order, and are so situated that they may act together, to be united in one organic body. As all Presbyterians unite in

adopting the same standards of doctrine and discipline, it is their duty thus to unite, provided they concur as to the sense in which the doctrinal standard is to be adopted, and are sincere in their purpose to adhere to the form of government and discipline prescribed in our book. In the application of this principle, we hold that no difference should be made between one class of Presbyterians and another; between the United Presbyterians, or Associate, or Reformed, or the New-school at the North, or the Old-school at the South. All who are willing to unite with us on the terms of cordial adoption of our standards of doctrine and order we are bound to welcome with the right-hand of fellowship.

4. There are reasons which render this union of Presbyterians, East and West, North and South, specially imperative at the present day. In the first place, other bodies of Christians, specially the Romanists and the Episcopalians, are not only rapidly and greatly increasing in numbers, but also in compactness. The Romanists are a unit in all matters concerning religion, and so generally act together in political affairs, that their power in the country is becoming a matter of great and general alarm. The Episcopalians, from the nature of their organization, are a more compact body in themselves than we are; and from the external character of their bond of union (Episcopacy rather than doctrine), less likely to be broken. These two churches bid fair to be the only two national churches in the land. The Methodists have a church South, and a church North; so have the Baptists; so had the Episcopalians during the war, but the reunion of the two bodies has already begun, and is sure to be speedily consummated. Shall we remain divided? Must we forfeit our national character? At the formation of our General Assembly it was in fact as well as in name, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. Must this name be dropped, or become a delusion? It is plain that we shall lose our prestige, our power for good, our relative standing among the great ecclesiastical bodies of the country, unless we can become, what our legal designation implies, the Presbyterian Church of the United States. We shall soon sink into the comparative insignificance of a provincial, or sectional body.



Were this a mere matter of church pride, it would not be unworthy of consideration. But it concerns all our highest interests, and the fulfilling our mission on earth. We shall be held to an account at the bar of God if we carelessly or wickedly throw away so great a talent as national unity. If this be done to gratify any miserable jealousies, or to accomplish any unworthy ends, we can hardly escape condemnation. This remark applies to Presbyterians of the South as well as to those of the North. If reunion be prevented merely by alienation of feeling, it will be a poor excuse in the day of judgment that they refused fellowship with their brethren because they hated them.

In the second place, considerations of patriotism are as urgent as those drawn from the interests of the church. The great aim of the national government, and the great desire of all good citizens, is the reconstruction of the Union. We hear on every side the utterance of the self-evident truth, that "conciliation is essential to reconstruction." The reunion of the Northern and Southern churches is almost indispensable to this conciliation. The separation began with the churches. It cannot well be healed without them. If all the great denominations, Methodist, Baptist, Episcopal, and Presbyterian, should cordially unite their dissevered communions, the political breach would *ipso facto* be built up. The great mass of the people North and South are included in these denominations, and if they come together in church-fellowship as before the war, we shall again be one people in heart as well as in political association. This is so plain and so important that it has not escaped the attention of the secular press. The *New York Times*, the most influential Republican paper in the country, the great advocate of the war, and staunch supporter of the government, has several times adverted to this subject, and uttered words of great weight and wisdom. In its issue for September 29, 1865, it says the action of the Assemblies of Presbyterians and Convention of the Congregationalists months ago was not conciliatory. For this it apologizes, but urges the duty of a different course for the present and future. It commends in strong terms the amicable spirit of the late Episcopal Convention in New York, and says: "In the public judgment it will

go hard with any denomination of Christians in this land—we care not who or what they may be—that shall so act, or so refuse to act, as to keep up sectional alienation. It is an insult to Christianity to claim that there is anything in its duties that requires a continuance of this strife. We can understand how the mere politician, who is accustomed to look with jaundiced eye, can imagine considerations which forbid conciliation with the South. We cannot imagine how a statesman who has the vision to take in closely and broadly the necessities of the country, can fail to do his utmost to bring harmony. Infinitely less can we conceive how any body of men acting in the name of that religion whose distinctive vital principle is love, and one of whose cardinal duties is forgiveness, should refuse to lend their aid to the healing of the wounds and the assuaging of the heart-burnings left by the conflict which saved the republic.”

In another paper (September 12), in an editorial under the caption, “Must there be confession before conciliation?” it asks, “Why keep up anger about what has exhaled into an airy nothing? This is not worthy of our manhood. It is beneath us, after winning such a triumph and receiving such a submission, to say that we will not give our hand until we have an open expression of penitence. The Southern cup of humiliation is bitter enough without our adding to it any such wormwood. It should content us that we have for ever established the true principles of our government, beyond all possibility of future assault. That should be the all-sufficient reward of the war, the full satisfaction of our hearts. If there be a pride in the Southern soul that clings to the shadow of the theory of secession, it will soon yield to the benign influences of our government, unless the Northern people embitter and repel it by their intolerance. We have only to do our part generously, as well as loyally, to wean the Southern people from all their old delusions, and to bring on a day when they will be of one mind with us in respect to the utter falsity of the ‘right of secession,’ as they now are in respect to the utter impossibility of secession itself.”

It is easy to say: If treason is a crime, those who have been guilty of treason should confess and repent. This is the prin-



ciple on which the action of the last General Assembly is founded, which action enjoins upon presbyteries and sessions not to receive into fellowship any minister or church member who took part in the late rebellion, until he had confessed his sin in so doing. We do not know that we have anything to say in reference to this subject beyond what was said in our last number. We admit that rebellion without just cause is a great crime. We admit that there was no just cause for the rebellion of the Southern states against the National Government. We admit further that the leaders and authors of that rebellion committed a great crime against God, as well as against their country, but we deny that all who took part in that rebellion were guilty of an offence which should debar them from ministerial or Christian communion. 1. This is plain to every man's conscience and common sense, whether he is able to see how it is or not. We do not believe that there is a man living, who really believes that all the Southern Christians who favoured the Southern cause thereby forfeited his right to be regarded as a child of God. We all know men in this predicament in whose Christian character we have perfect confidence. 2. It is also plain that rebellion is a political, as distinguished from a moral offence, *i. e.*, an offence which is in its nature, and therefore under all circumstances wrong. Rebellion is right or wrong according to circumstances, and according to the motives by which men are led to engage in it. It can never be right to commit murder, to blaspheme God, or to hate our brethren. But we all admit that rebellion may sometimes be a duty; and at other times, a matter of indifference. That is, there are cases in which participation in an unjust rebellion is not a sin in the sight of God, much less an offence for which church courts can justly take cognizance. This, as we before remarked, is universally admitted. Taking the side of the Stuarts in England was not in all cases a sin, and in no case perhaps a proper ground for church censure. The same may be said with regard to siding with the mother country in our revolutionary war. Why then should not a principle universally recognized in other cases be applied to the present rebellion? If it be not a sin against God, or an ecclesiastical offence to believe in the right of secession, why should every man at the South who be-

lieved in that doctrine, and felt bound in conscience to act upon it, be cast out as unholy, and be to us as a heathen man and a publican? Is there no Pharisaic self-righteousness in this? 3. It is also evidently a false principle that every man who takes part in an unjust or sinful war is in such a sense sinful that he should be shut out from the church. Perhaps nine-tenths of the Christians at the North believed that the acquisition of Texas was made in the interests of slavery; that the annexation of that country was consummated in any unconstitutional manner; that the war with Mexico, consequent thereon, was brought about by the unrighteous measures of our government, and therefore involved great national guilt. No one however ever dreamed of requiring all those who took part in that war, or sympathized with the national cause, rejoicing in the success of our arms, and mourning over our discomfitures, to make confession of their sins as a condition of church-fellowship. Every Old-school man also believes that the disruption of our church in 1837 and '38 was a great sin, but no one requires profession of repentance for that sin as a condition of the reception of those who joined in the schism. Thousands of people at the North sympathized with the South, and in many ways gave aid and comfort to the rebels. No one calls for arraigning them before our church courts. It is plain that a principle which cannot be carried out is false; and that those who are strenuous in enforcing it in one case, while they refuse to enforce it another, are either mentally bewildered or insincere.

This paper, as we expected, has not turned out to be a recantation of our former opinions, nor even an apology for them. As we have been widely and severely censured, we thought it due to higher interests than those merely personal, to give a brief statement of the course which this *Review* has actually taken since the commencement of the war. Those who feel called upon to censure, may now at least know what it is they condemn, and not needlessly incur the sin of bearing false witness. We have from the beginning denied the right of secession; we have maintained that the rebellion was without any adequate provocation; that it was obligatory on the national government to employ all its resources for its suppres-



sion; that the war to that end was a righteous war; that it was the duty of all citizens to sustain and support the government in this national struggle to the utmost of their ability; that as slavery was the cause of the rebellion, and as the South constantly refused to accept any reasonable terms of accommodation, the President was right in emancipating all the slaves within our military lines, and that the government is right in demanding the entire and final abolition of slavery through the country. As to the union of churches, we have maintained that all Presbyterians should be joined in one body, New-school and Old-school, Presbyterians of the North and of the South, provided they agree in adopting and carrying out our constitutional standards of doctrine and order; that no other conditions of union should be demanded of any party, and that the Assembly has no right to enforce any other.

It has been intimated in some quarters, with small indications of sorrow, that in pursuing the cause above indicated this *Review* has lost the support of the loyal states. We learn from the publisher that this is a mistake. The list of subscribers in those states is as large now as it was before the war. It is in the seceding states the falling off has occurred. We lost three hundred subscribers at one blow when hostilities commenced. The war caused the price of paper to rise threefold, while all other expenses were proportionally increased. Other journals suffered in the same way. Some were suspended, others reduced their size, and others raised their price, while all called loudly for help. We have made no such call. Some kind friends, without our knowledge, brought the matter before the last Assembly, but the Editor has not lifted a finger to secure patronage for the *Review*. To him its discontinuance would be a great relief. He has carried it as a ball-and-chain for forty years, with scarcely any other compensation than the high privilege and honour of making it an organ for upholding sound Presbyterianism, the cause of the country, and the honour of our common Redeemer.

# THE BIBLICAL REPERTORY

AND

## PRINCETON REVIEW.

EDITED BY

CHARLES HODGE, D. D.

"THE BIBLICAL REPERTORY" was begun in 1825, by the present editor. It "was not intended to be original in its general character, but to consist of selections from the writings of the most distinguished scholars." The first four volumes were published on this plan. In 1829, from which the present series dates, Dr. Hodge associated with himself several gentlemen who resided in Princeton and its neighbourhood, and from thenceforward it appeared as a Review, "embracing in its plan the whole range of theological and religious subjects." The title *Princeton Review* was not added till 1837, but it has continued under nearly the same editorial superintendence for forty years, and sustained an honourable reputation for learning and ability both in Europe and America.

Among those now deceased, whose contributions are to be found in its volumes, are

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